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Collusion and Bargaining in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly : An Experiment

Title data

Fischer, Christian ; Normann, Hans-Theo:
Collusion and Bargaining in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly : An Experiment.
In: European Economic Review. Vol. 111 (January 2019) . - pp. 360-379.
ISSN 0014-2921
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.10.005

Abstract in another language

In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost, we investigate experimentally how players cooperate (collude implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. In our treatments without communication, players fail to cooperate and essentially play the static Nash equilibrium (consistent with previous results). With communication, inefficient firms gain at the expense of efficient ones. When the role of the efficient firm is earned in a contest, the efficient firm earns higher profits than when this role is randomly allocated. Bargaining solutions do not satisfactorily predict outcomes.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Juniorprofessur Internationale Volkswirtschaftslehre
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Juniorprofessur Internationale Volkswirtschaftslehre > Juniorprofessur Internationale Volkswirtschaftslehre - Juniorprof. Dr. Christian Fischer
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2018 07:52
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2018 07:52
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/46328