Weighted Committee Games

Title data

Kurz, Sascha ; Mayer, Alexander ; Napel, Stefan:
Weighted Committee Games.
2019
Event: Individual Preferences and Social Choice , 11.-12.04.2019 , Graz, Österreich.
(Conference item: Workshop , Speech )

Abstract in another language

Weighted committee games generalize n-player simple voting games to m>=3 alternatives. The committee's aggregation rule treats votes anonymously but parties, shareholders, members of supranational organizations, etc. differ in their numbers of votes. Infinitely many vote distributions induce only finitely many distinct mappings from preference profiles to winners, i.e., non-equivalent committees. We identify and compare all committees which use Borda, Copeland, plurality or antiplurality rule. Their geometry and differing numbers of equivalence classes - e.g., 51 for Borda vs. 4 for Copeland rule if n!=m!=3 - have so far escaped notice. They determine voting equilibria, the distribution of power and other aspects of collective choice.

Further data

Item Type:	Conference item (Speech)
Refereed:	No
Additional notes:	speaker: Sascha Kurz
Keywords:	weighted voting; simple games; social choice; geometry of voting; equivalence classes; Borda rule; Copeland rule; plurality; antiplurality
Subject classification:	Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91B12 JEL: D71, C71, C63
Institutions of the University:	Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematics in Economy Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility
Result of work at the UBT:	Yes
DDC Subjects:	000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics 500 Science > 510 Mathematics
Date Deposited:	02 Apr 2019 09:36
Last Modified:	02 Apr 2019 09:36
URI:	https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/48520