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Influence in weighted committees

Title data

Kurz, Sascha ; Mayer, Alexander ; Napel, Stefan:
Influence in weighted committees.
In: European Economic Review. Vol. 132 (February 2021) . - Art.Nr. 103634.
ISSN 0014-2921
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103634

Official URL: Volltext

Abstract in another language

Committee decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted aggregation rule, and so does the distribution of power among committee members. We quantify how different voting methods such as pairwise majority votes, plurality voting with or without a runoff, or Borda rule map asymmetric numbers of seats, shares, voting weights, etc. to influence on collective outcomes when individual preferences vary. Generalizations of the Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices are proposed and applied to elections of the IMF Managing Director. Previous analysis of a priori power in binary voting is thus extended to universal social choice rules.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: weighted voting; voting; power; weighted committee games; plurality; runoff; Borda rule; Copeland rule; IMF Executive Board; IMF Director
Subject classification: Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91B12
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science
300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
500 Science > 510 Mathematics
Date Deposited: 16 Feb 2021 12:57
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2021 12:57
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/63054