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Are Weighted Games Sufficiently Good for Binary Voting?

Title data

Kurz, Sascha:
Are Weighted Games Sufficiently Good for Binary Voting?
In: Homo Oeconomicus. Vol. 38 (December 2021) . - pp. 29-36.
ISSN 2366-6161
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-021-00111-6

Official URL: Volltext

Abstract in another language

Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we loose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games. It turns out that the deviation is relatively small.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: power measurement; weighted games
Subject classification: Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91B12 (91A12)
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics
Profile Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science
300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
500 Science > 510 Mathematics
Date Deposited: 05 Oct 2022 08:28
Last Modified: 05 Oct 2022 08:28
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/72283