Title data
Kaniovski, Serguei ; Kurz, Sascha:
Representation compatible power indices.
2015
Event: 27th European Conference on Operational Research
, 12.-15.07.2015
, Glasgow, Scotland.
(Conference item: Conference
,
Speech
)
Related URLs
Abstract in another language
This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions being proportional to the distribution of weights in the average representation. This makes these indices representation-compatible, a property not fulfilled by classical power indices. Average representations can be tailored to reveal the equivalence classes of voters defined by the Isbell desirability relation, which leads to a pair of new power indices that ascribes equal power to all members of an equivalence class.
Further data
Item Type: | Conference item (Speech) |
---|---|
Refereed: | No |
Additional notes: | Speaker: Serguei Kaniovski |
Keywords: | average representation; power index; proportionality between weights and power |
Subject classification: | MSC: 91A12; 91A80 |
Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility Faculties Profile Fields Profile Fields > Emerging Fields |
Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
DDC Subjects: | 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
Date Deposited: | 21 Jul 2015 08:59 |
Last Modified: | 21 Jul 2015 09:14 |
URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/16863 |