at Google ScholarTitle data
McKay, Michael ; Cseh, Ágnes ; Manlove, David:
Envy-freeness in 3D hedonic games.
In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.
Vol. 38
(2024)
.
- 37.
ISSN 1573-7454
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-024-09657-6
Abstract in another language
We study the problem of fairly partitioning a set of agents into coalitions based on the agents’ additively separable preferences, which can also be viewed as a hedonic game. We study three successively weaker solution concepts, related to envy, weakly justified envy, and justified envy. In a model in which coalitions may have any size, trivial solutions exist for these concepts, which provides a strong motivation for placing restrictions on coalition size. In this paper, we require feasible coalitions to have size three. We study the existence of partitions that are envy-free, weakly justified envy-free, and justified envy-free, and the computational complexity of finding such partitions, if they exist. We impose various restrictions on the agents’ preferences and present a complete complexity classification in terms of these restrictions.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics > Chair Mathematical Economics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Jörg Rambau Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Dynamical Systems and Data > Chair Dynamical Systems and Data - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Peter Koltai |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: | 31 Jul 2024 05:45 |
| Last Modified: | 31 Jul 2024 05:45 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/90117 |