Banning Banking in EU Emissions Trading?

Titelangaben

Schleich, Joachim ; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin ; Hoppe, Christian ; Seifert, Stefan:
Banning Banking in EU Emissions Trading?
In: Energy Policy. Bd. 34 (2006) Heft 1 . - S. 112-120.
ISSN 0301-4215
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2004.06.009

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Abstract

Admitting banking in emissions trading systems reduces overall compliance costs by allowing for inter-temporal flexibility: cost savings can be traded over time. However, unless individual EU Member States (MS) decide differently, the transfer of unused allowances from the period of 2005–2007 into the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. 2008–2012, will be prohibited. In this paper, we first explore the implications of such a ban on banking when initial emission targets are lenient. This analysis is based on a simulation which was recently carried out in Germany with companies and with a student control group. The findings suggest that a EU-wide ban on banking would lead to efficiency losses in addition to those losses which arise from the lack of inter-temporal flexibility. Second, we use simple game-theoretic considerations to argue that, under reasonable assumptions, such a EU-wide ban on banking will be the equilibrium outcome. Thus, to avoid a possible prisoners’ dilemma, MS should have co-ordinated their banking decisions.