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Napel, Stefan ; Widgrén, Mika:
Strategic versus Non-strategic Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers : The Consultation Procedure.
In: Social Choice and Welfare.
Bd. 37
(2011)
Heft 3
.
- S. 511-541.
ISSN 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0502-5
Abstract
This paper evaluates the distribution of power within the Council of the European Union from the a priori perspective of constitutional design using two distinct ap- proaches: (1) applying traditional voting power indices; (2) carrying out strategic equi- librium analysis of the EU’s consultation procedure. It clarifies why both approaches lead to different power indications, and investigates the determinants of the differences’ magnitudes. Depending on one’s assumptions about behavior of the consultation proce- dure’s agenda setter, the European Commission, traditional indices turn out to deliver a good approximation also of relative strategic power in the Council.