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Codecision in Context : Implications for the Balance of Power in the EU

Title data

Maaser, Nicola ; Mayer, Alexander:
Codecision in Context : Implications for the Balance of Power in the EU.
In: Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. 46 (2016) Issue 1 . - pp. 213-237.
ISSN 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0910-7

Abstract in another language

The paper analyzes the European Union's codecision procedure as a bargaining game between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The relative influence of these institutions on legislative decision-making in the EU is assessed under a priori preference assumptions. In contrast to previous studies, we do not consider the codecision procedure in isolation but include several aspects of the EU's wider institutional framework. The finding that the Council is more influential than the Parliament due to its more conservative internal decision
rule is robust to adding 'context' to the basic model, but the imbalance is considerably attenuated.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: Legislative procedures; European Union codecision; bargaining; spatial voting; power measurement
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV > Chair Economics IV - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences
300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Date Deposited: 10 Mar 2016 08:31
Last Modified: 03 May 2017 08:12
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/31669