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Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration

Title data

Stadelmann, David ; Eichenberger, Reiner ; Portmann, Marco:
Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration.
In: Constitutional Political Economy. Vol. 25 (2014) Issue 2 . - pp. 207-229.
ISSN 1043-4062
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9162-2

Abstract in another language

The separation of powers is endogenous to the politico-economic process, and thus to politicians' self-interest. Only little is known about what really drives politicians' behavior when shaping institutional rules with respect to the separation of powers. We econometrically compare votes of parliamentary representatives and their constituents on a popular initiative that directly aimed at weakening the separation of powers in 1922 in Switzerland. We analyze whether the strength of individual ties to the public service affect representatives\x92 behavior, holding constituents' preferences constant. Our results indicate that while politicians tend to represent their constituents' preferences, representatives with ties to the public service have a higher probability of supporting the eligibility of public servants for the legislature. Thus, they favor reducing the separation of powers between legislature and administration.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: Separation of powers; Administration; Public servants; Legislative voting; Constituents' preferences
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Professorship Development Economics > Professorship Development Economics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. David Stadelmann
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Innovation and Consumer Protection
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Professorship Development Economics
Profile Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
300 Social sciences > 340 Law
Date Deposited: 01 Dec 2014 09:44
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2018 11:28
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/3307