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Collective choices under ambiguity

Title data

Levati, M. Vittoria ; Napel, Stefan ; Soraperra, Ivan:
Collective choices under ambiguity.
In: Group Decision and Negotiation. Vol. 26 (January 2017) Issue 1 . - pp. 133-149.
ISSN 1572-9907
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-016-9488-4

Abstract in another language

We investigate experimentally whether collective choice environments matter for individual attitudes to ambiguity. In a simple two-urn Ellsberg experiment, one urn offers a 45% chance of winning a fixed monetary prize while the other offers an ambiguous chance. Participants choose either
individually or in groups of three. Group decision rules vary in the level of individual responsibility for the others' payoffs: the collective choice is taken by majority, randomly delegated to two group members, or randomly delegated to a single group member. Although most participants display consistent ambiguity attitudes across their decisions, taking responsibility for the others tends to foster ambiguity aversion.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; Majority voting; Random delegation; Experiment
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV > Chair Economics IV - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences
300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Date Deposited: 25 Jan 2017 07:18
Last Modified: 03 May 2017 08:12
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/35735