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Kurz, Sascha ; Maaser, Nicola ; Napel, Stefan:
On the Democratic Weights of Nations.
In: Journal of Political Economy.
Bd. 125
(2017)
Heft 5
.
- S. 1599-1634.
ISSN 1537-534X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/693039
Abstract
Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the ‘one person, one vote’ principle by demanding every individual’s influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of constituency sizes if voter preferences are independent and identically distributed. This is knife-edged, however, in that preference polarization along constituency lines quickly calls for a Shapley value-based variation of simple proportionality.