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Dissonance and Moorean Propositions

Title data

Borgoni, Cristina:
Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.
In: Dialectica. Vol. 69 (2015) Issue 1 . - pp. 107-127.
ISSN 1746-8361
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12095

Abstract in another language

In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while her overall automatic behaviour suggests that she believes that not-P. In contrast with several mainstream views, this paper defends the contradictory-belief view of some relevant dissonance cases and explores its consequences regarding Moorean propositions. The paper argues that in relevant cases, the dissonant person is justified in asserting (or believing) a Moorean proposition on the grounds of her explicit view on the subject matter and the recognition of her opposing beliefs. The person is irrational in being dissonant, but not in asserting a Moorean proposition.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Institutions of the University: Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Cristina Borgoni
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie)
Result of work at the UBT: No
DDC Subjects: 100 Philosophy and psychology
100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy
100 Philosophy and psychology > 120 Epistemology
Date Deposited: 05 Apr 2018 08:57
Last Modified: 06 Apr 2018 07:23
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/43117