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Borgoni, Cristina:
Epistemic akrasia and mental agency.
In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Bd. 6
(2015)
Heft 4
.
- S. 827-842.
ISSN 1878-5166
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0205-4
Abstract
In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: (1) S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and (2) Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I examine three objections to their possibility. I suggest that the key to defending the possibility of epistemic akrasia is to explain condition (2). I finally argue that epistemic akrasia is possible, and that it represents a failure of mental agency.
Weitere Angaben
| Publikationsform: | Artikel in einer Zeitschrift |
|---|---|
| Begutachteter Beitrag: | Ja |
| Institutionen der Universität: | Fakultäten > Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät Fakultäten > Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät > Institut für Philosophie Fakultäten > Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät > Institut für Philosophie > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) Fakultäten > Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät > Institut für Philosophie > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Cristina Borgoni Fakultäten |
| Titel an der UBT entstanden: | Nein |
| Themengebiete aus DDC: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 120 Epistemologie |
| Eingestellt am: | 09 Apr 2018 09:35 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 09 Apr 2018 09:35 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/43121 |