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Epistemic akrasia and mental agency

Title data

Borgoni, Cristina:
Epistemic akrasia and mental agency.
In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Vol. 6 (2015) Issue 4 . - pp. 827-842.
ISSN 1878-5166
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0205-4

Abstract in another language

In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: (1) S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and (2) Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I examine three objections to their possibility. I suggest that the key to defending the possibility of epistemic akrasia is to explain condition (2). I finally argue that epistemic akrasia is possible, and that it represents a failure of mental agency.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie)
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Cristina Borgoni
Faculties
Result of work at the UBT: No
DDC Subjects: 100 Philosophy and psychology
100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy
100 Philosophy and psychology > 120 Epistemology
Date Deposited: 09 Apr 2018 09:35
Last Modified: 09 Apr 2018 09:35
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/43121