Titlebar

Export bibliographic data
Literature by the same author
plus on the publication server
plus at Google Scholar

 

Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning

Title data

Borgoni, Cristina ; Luthra, Yannig:
Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning.
In: Philosophical Studies. Vol. 174 (2017) Issue 4 . - pp. 877-886.
ISSN 1573-0883
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0711-6

Abstract in another language

There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain the possibility of epistemic akrasia.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie)
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) > Professur Philosophie (Erkenntnistheorie) - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Cristina Borgoni
Faculties
Result of work at the UBT: No
DDC Subjects: 100 Philosophy and psychology
100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy
100 Philosophy and psychology > 120 Epistemology
Date Deposited: 09 Apr 2018 09:43
Last Modified: 09 Apr 2018 09:43
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/43123