The power of the largest player

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Kurz, Sascha:
The power of the largest player.
In: Economics Letters. Bd. 168 (2018) . - S. 123-126.
ISSN 0165-1765
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.034

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Abstract

Decisions in a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee are often modeled as a weighted game. Influence of a member is then measured by a power index. A large variety of different indices has been introduced in the literature. This paper analyzes how power indices differ with respect to the largest possible power of a non-dictatorial player. It turns out that the considered set of power indices can be partitioned into two classes. This may serve as another indication which index to use in a given application.