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Do We Have Reasons to Do as We Believe We Ought to Do?

Title data

Fink, Julian:
Do We Have Reasons to Do as We Believe We Ought to Do?
In: Silar, Mario ; Schwember Augier, Felipe (ed.): Practical Rationality : Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity. - Aranguren : Ziur Navarra , 2009 . - pp. 65-79

Abstract in another language

Suppose you believe you ought to A. Would a failure of yours to A imply that you are not entirely as you ought to be? Ought you to A if you believe you to ought to A? This paper argues for a qualified version of this claim. It is qualified in two ways. First, I assume that this can be so only if ‘if you believe you ought to A’ appears within the scope of ‘you ought’. That is, you ought to [if you believe you ought to A, then A.] Second, I argue that you ought to do as you believe you ought to only as far as it goes; that is, unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so. In this sense, we have a pro tanto reason to do, as we believe we ought to do.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a book
Refereed: Yes
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professur Praktische Philosophie > Professur Praktische Philosophie - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Julian Fink
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professur Praktische Philosophie
Result of work at the UBT: No
DDC Subjects: 100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy
Date Deposited: 17 Oct 2018 11:51
Last Modified: 17 Oct 2018 11:51
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/46077