on the publication serverTitle data
Kurz, Sascha ; Mayer, Alexander ; Napel, Stefan:
Weighted Committee Games.
In: European Journal of Operational Research.
(21 October 2019)
.
ISSN 0377-2217
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.10.023
Related URLs
Abstract in another language
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of different voting weights (shareholdings, party seats, etc.) under plurality, Borda, Copeland, and antiplurality rule. The number and geometry of weight equivalence classes differ widely across the rules. Decisions can be much more sensitive to weights in Borda committees than (anti-)plurality or Copeland ones.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | Group decisions and negotiations; Weighted voting; Simple games; Scoring rules;
Majority rule |
| Subject classification: | Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91B12
JEL: D71, C71, C63 |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics > Chair Mathematical Economics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Jörg Rambau Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Nov 2019 07:43 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Nov 2019 07:43 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/53428 |
