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Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

Title data

Kurz, Sascha ; Moyouwou, Issofa ; Touyem, Hilaire:
Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output.
Bayreuth , 2020 . - 25 p.

Official URL: Volltext

Abstract in another language

The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in the input and the output. The corresponding games are called (j,k) simple games. Here we present a new axiomatization for the Shapley-Shubik index for (j,k) simple games as well as for a continuous variant, which may be considered as the limit case.

Further data

Item Type: Preprint, postprint
Keywords: simple games; several levels of approval; Shapley-Shubik index; power indices; axiomatization; interval decisions
Subject classification: Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91A40 91B12 (91A80 91A12)
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility
Faculties
Profile Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science
300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
500 Science > 510 Mathematics
Date Deposited: 01 Feb 2020 22:00
Last Modified: 03 Feb 2020 06:04
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/54262