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Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director

Title data

Napel, Stefan ; Mayer, Alexander:
Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director.
In: Economics of Governance. (27 July 2020) Issue 21 . - pp. 237-244.
ISSN 1435-8131
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00240-9

Official URL: Volltext

Abstract in another language

Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund’s Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across different electoral procedures. The USA’s Executive Director can expect to come closer to its top preference under plurality rule than for pairwise majority comparisons or plurality with a runoff; opposite applies to everybody else. Differences of US success between voting rules dominate the within-rule differences between most other Directors, and much of the latest reform of quotas.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: IMF executive board; IMF quota reform; Weighted voting; Voting procedures; Non-binary voting
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Date Deposited: 04 Nov 2020 08:20
Last Modified: 25 Mar 2021 11:08
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/59145