Hiding or Revealing : Their Indirect Evolution in the Acquiring‑a‑Company Game

Titelangaben

Güth, Werner ; Napel, Stefan:
Hiding or Revealing : Their Indirect Evolution in the Acquiring‑a‑Company Game.
In: Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review. Bd. 19 (2022) Heft 2 . - S. 569-585.
ISSN 2188-2096
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40844-022-00231-x

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Abstract

The Acquiring-a-Company game of Bazerman and Samuelson (J Confl Resolut 27(4):618–634, 1983) is modified by letting the privately informed seller send a numerical value message to the prospective buyer. A population of sellers reveal or hide their private information according to their categorical type rather than by engaging in consequentialistic decision-making. Population shares of the types evolve according to expected profits (fitness). The analysis illustrates how specific institutional and behavioral aspects shape the creation of surplus in the market and possibilities for maintaining a positive share of revealing sellers.