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What (In)coherence Is Not

Title data

Fink, Julian:
What (In)coherence Is Not.
In: Grazer Philosophische Studien. Vol. 99 (2022) Issue 2 . - pp. 125-134.
ISSN 1875-6735

Official URL: Volltext

Abstract in another language

Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the
account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this article it is argued that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only
does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent
just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: incoherence; structural irrationality; Worsnip
Institutions of the University: Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Practical Philosophy
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Practical Philosophy > Professor Practical Philosophy - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Julian Fink
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies
Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 100 Philosophy and psychology
100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy
Date Deposited: 21 Oct 2022 05:40
Last Modified: 07 Nov 2022 05:59
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/72483