Preferences : What We Can and Can’t Do with Them

Titelangaben

Thoma, Johanna:
Preferences : What We Can and Can’t Do with Them.
In: Philosophia. Bd. 52 (2024) Heft 5 . - S. 1269-1278.
ISSN 1574-9274
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00794-6

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Abstract

In her Choosing Well, Chrisoula Andreou puts forth an account of instrumental rationality that is revisionary in two respects. First, it changes the goalpost or standard of instrumental rationality to include “categorial” appraisal responses, alongside preferences, which are relational. Second, her account is explicitly diachronic, applying to series of choices as well as isolated ones. Andreou takes both revisions to be necessary for dealing with problematic choice scenarios agents with disorderly preferences might find themselves in. Focusing on problem cases involving cyclical preferences, I will first argue that her first revision is undermotivated once we accept the second. If we are willing to grant that there are diachronic rationality constraints, the preference-based picture can get us further than Andreou acknowledges. I will then turn to present additional grounds for rejecting the preference-based picture. However, these grounds also seem to undermine Andreou’s own appeal to categorial appraisal responses.