Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union

Title data

Krumm, Raimund ; Herz, Bernhard:
Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union.
In: European Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 13 (1997) Issue 4 . - pp. 691-703.
ISSN 0176-2680
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00030-X

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Abstract in another language

This paper addresses the question of criteria for selection of EMU members. We identify two factors in the decision process: (1) The costs and benefits which the individual countries attribute to alternative EMU arrangements (`hard-core', medium-sized, all EU members), and (2) the binding institutional restrictions, i.e., the distribution of votes in the European Council and the minimum vote requirements. Within this framework the EU countries are assigned to different groups according to their degree of convergence. Based on stability concessions and side payments these groups decide on the final EMU composition. We show that minimum vote requirements can lead to a suboptimal size of the EMU and can threaten the feasibility of a multi-speed monetary union.