## Title data

Kaniovski, Serguei ; Kurz, Sascha:

**Representation-compatible power indices.**

Bayreuth
,
2015
. - 28 p.

## Abstract in another language

This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting

power, with power distributions being proportional to the distribution of weights in the average representation. This makes these indices representation-compatible, a property not fulfilled by classical power indices. Average representations can be tailored to reveal the equivalence classes of voters defined by the Isbell desirability relation, which leads to a pair of new power indices that

ascribes equal power to all members of an equivalence class.

## Further data

Item Type: | Preprint, postprint |
---|---|

Keywords: | average representation; power index; proportionality between weights and power |

Subject classification: | MSC: 91A12, 91A80 |

Institutions of the University: | Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics Profile Fields Profile Fields > Emerging Fields Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility |

Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |

DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |

Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2015 21:00 |

Last Modified: | 21 Mar 2019 10:39 |

URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/15447 |