at Google ScholarTitle data
Napel, Stefan ; Nohn, Andreas ; Alonso-Meijide, José Maria:
Monotonicity of Power in Weighted Voting Games with Restricted Communication.
In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
Vol. 64
(2012)
Issue 3
.
- pp. 247-257.
ISSN 0165-4896
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.008
Abstract in another language
Indices that evaluate the distribution of power in simple games are commonly required to be monotonic in voting weights when the game represents a voting body such as a shareholder meeting, parliament, etc. The standard notions of local or global monotonicity are bound to be violated, however, if cooperation is restricted to coalitions that are connected by a communication graph. This paper proposes new monotonicity concepts for power in games with communication structure and investigates the monotonicity properties of the Myerson value, the restricted Banzhaf value, the position value, and the average tree solution.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | powermeasurement; weightedvoting; restrictedcommunication; monotonicity; centrality; Myerson value; position value; average tree solution |
| Subject classification: | C71 |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics 500 Science 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Feb 2016 09:12 |
| Last Modified: | 03 May 2017 08:12 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/30225 |