at Google ScholarTitle data
Napel, Stefan ; Oldehaver, Gunnar:
A Dynamic Perspective on Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition.
In: Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Vol. 39
(2011)
Issue 1
.
- pp. 29-49.
ISSN 1573-0468
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-010-9140-1
Abstract in another language
Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, ignores its possible dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder collusion, resulting in dynamic welfare gains that reduce and may outweigh the static losses which are caused by regulation’s distortive effect on equilibrium qualities. Verdicts on MQS thus depend even more on the market structure at hand than has been acknowledged.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | Minimal quality standard; Cournot competition; collusion |
| Subject classification: | L41; L51; L15; D43; |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Feb 2016 09:17 |
| Last Modified: | 03 May 2017 08:12 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/30226 |