at Google ScholarTitle data
Napel, Stefan ; Widgrén, Mika:
Strategic versus Non-strategic Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers : The Consultation Procedure.
In: Social Choice and Welfare.
Vol. 37
(2011)
Issue 3
.
- pp. 511-541.
ISSN 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0502-5
Abstract in another language
This paper evaluates the distribution of power within the Council of the European Union from the a priori perspective of constitutional design using two distinct ap- proaches: (1) applying traditional voting power indices; (2) carrying out strategic equi- librium analysis of the EU’s consultation procedure. It clarifies why both approaches lead to different power indications, and investigates the determinants of the differences’ magnitudes. Depending on one’s assumptions about behavior of the consultation proce- dure’s agenda setter, the European Commission, traditional indices turn out to deliver a good approximation also of relative strategic power in the Council.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | Voting power; spatial voting; agenda setting; Council of Ministers; European Commission |
| Subject classification: | C70, D71, H77 |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Feb 2016 09:21 |
| Last Modified: | 03 May 2017 08:12 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/30227 |