at Google ScholarTitle data
Alonso-Meijide, José Maria ; Bowles, Carlos ; Holler, Manfred J. ; Napel, Stefan:
Monotonicity of Power in Games with A Priori Unions.
In: Theory and Decision.
Vol. 66
(2009)
Issue 1
.
- pp. 17-37.
ISSN 1573-7187
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9114-2
Abstract in another language
Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some given voting weight as to any player of the same game with smaller weight. This local monotonicity and a related global property however are frequently and for good reasons violated when indices take account of a priori unions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity). This paper introduces adaptations of the conventional mono- tonicity notions that are suitable for voting games with an exogenous coalition structure. A taxonomy of old and new monotonicity concepts is provided, and different coalitional versions of the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices are compared accordingly.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | monotonicity; voting power; coalitional values; coalition structures; a priori unions |
| Subject classification: | 91A12, 91A80 |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Feb 2016 10:20 |
| Last Modified: | 03 May 2017 08:12 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/30231 |