at Google ScholarTitle data
Maaser, Nicola ; Mayer, Alexander:
Codecision in Context : Implications for the Balance of Power in the EU.
In: Social Choice and Welfare.
Vol. 46
(2016)
Issue 1
.
- pp. 213-237.
ISSN 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0910-7
Abstract in another language
The paper analyzes the European Union's codecision procedure as a bargaining game between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The relative influence of these institutions on legislative decision-making in the EU is assessed under a priori preference assumptions. In contrast to previous studies, we do not consider the codecision procedure in isolation but include several aspects of the EU's wider institutional framework. The finding that the Council is more influential than the Parliament due to its more conservative internal decision
rule is robust to adding 'context' to the basic model, but the imbalance is considerably attenuated.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | Legislative procedures; European Union codecision; bargaining; spatial voting; power measurement |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Mar 2016 08:31 |
| Last Modified: | 03 May 2017 08:12 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/31669 |