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Portmann, Marco ; Stadelmann, David ; Eichenberger, Reiner:
District magnitude and representation of the majority's preferences : Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes.
In: Public Choice.
Vol. 151
(2012)
Issue 3-4
.
- pp. 585-610.
ISSN 0048-5829
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9760-0
Abstract in another language
Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament\x92s voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives\x92 incentives to adhere to citizens\x92 revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences.