at Google ScholarTitle data
Stadelmann, David ; Portmann, Marco ; Eichenberger, Reiner:
The law of large districts : How district magnitude affects the quality of political representation.
In: European Journal of Political Economy.
Vol. 35
(2014)
.
- pp. 128-140.
ISSN 0176-2680
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.05.002
Abstract in another language
It is well established that individual parliamentary representatives are less likely to decide according to the preferences of their constituency when the number of representatives per district, i.e. district magnitude, increases. However, we propose that for majority decisions of district representatives the opposite holds due to the existence of a law of large numbers in political representation. The academic literature has so far focused on the behavior of individual politicians but disregarded systematic aggregation effects. We provide a theoretical discussion and offer empirical evidence for the validity of a law of large numbers in political representation: As district magnitude increases, the quality of political representation by the majority of representatives increases, too.