at Google ScholarTitle data
Levati, M. Vittoria ; Napel, Stefan ; Soraperra, Ivan:
Collective choices under ambiguity.
In: Group Decision and Negotiation.
Vol. 26
(2017)
Issue 1
.
- pp. 133-149.
ISSN 1572-9907
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-016-9488-4
Abstract in another language
We investigate experimentally whether collective choice environments matter for individual attitudes to ambiguity. In a simple two-urn Ellsberg experiment, one urn offers a 45% chance of winning a fixed monetary prize while the other offers an ambiguous chance. Participants choose either
individually or in groups of three. Group decision rules vary in the level of individual responsibility for the others' payoffs: the collective choice is taken by majority, randomly delegated to two group members, or randomly delegated to a single group member. Although most participants display consistent ambiguity attitudes across their decisions, taking responsibility for the others tends to foster ambiguity aversion.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | Ambiguity aversion; Majority voting; Random delegation; Experiment |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jan 2017 07:18 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Nov 2022 12:34 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/35735 |