at Google ScholarTitle data
Herweg, Fabian ; Müller, Daniel ; Weinschenk, Philipp:
Salience, Competition, and Decoy Goods.
In: Economics Letters.
Vol. 153
(2017)
.
- pp. 28-31.
ISSN 0165-1765
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.026
Abstract in another language
We consider a brand manufacturer who can offer, next to its high-quality product, also a decoy good and faces competition by a competitive fringe that produces low quality. We show that the brand manufacturer optimally provides a decoy good to boost the demand for its main product if consumers’ purchasing decisions are distorted by salient thinking. The optimal decoy good is designed such that the superior quality of the brand manufacturer’s main product and the unattractive feature of the fringe product are salient.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | Competition; Decoy good; Salience |
| Subject classification: | JEL classification: L13; L15; D03; D21 |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VIII: International Competition Policy > Chair Economics VIII: International Competition Policy - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Fabian Herweg Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VIII: International Competition Policy |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Dec 2017 08:47 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Oct 2022 08:00 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/40779 |