at Google ScholarTitle data
Borgoni, Cristina:
Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.
In: Dialectica.
Vol. 69
(2015)
Issue 1
.
- pp. 107-127.
ISSN 1746-8361
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12095
Abstract in another language
In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while her overall automatic behaviour suggests that she believes that not-P. In contrast with several mainstream views, this paper defends the contradictory-belief view of some relevant dissonance cases and explores its consequences regarding Moorean propositions. The paper argues that in relevant cases, the dissonant person is justified in asserting (or believing) a Moorean proposition on the grounds of her explicit view on the subject matter and the recognition of her opposing beliefs. The person is irrational in being dissonant, but not in asserting a Moorean proposition.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Cristina Borgoni Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology |
| Result of work at the UBT: | No |
| DDC Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and psychology 100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and psychology > 120 Epistemology |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Apr 2018 08:57 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Apr 2018 07:23 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/43117 |