at Google ScholarTitle data
Borgoni, Cristina:
Epistemic akrasia and mental agency.
In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Vol. 6
(2015)
Issue 4
.
- pp. 827-842.
ISSN 1878-5166
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0205-4
Abstract in another language
In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: (1) S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and (2) Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I examine three objections to their possibility. I suggest that the key to defending the possibility of epistemic akrasia is to explain condition (2). I finally argue that epistemic akrasia is possible, and that it represents a failure of mental agency.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Cristina Borgoni Faculties |
| Result of work at the UBT: | No |
| DDC Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and psychology 100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and psychology > 120 Epistemology |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Apr 2018 09:35 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Apr 2018 09:35 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/43121 |