at Google ScholarTitle data
Borgoni, Cristina ; Luthra, Yannig:
Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning.
In: Philosophical Studies.
Vol. 174
(2017)
Issue 4
.
- pp. 877-886.
ISSN 1573-0883
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0711-6
Abstract in another language
There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain the possibility of epistemic akrasia.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology > Professor Philosophy - Epistemology - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Cristina Borgoni Faculties |
| Result of work at the UBT: | No |
| DDC Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and psychology 100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and psychology > 120 Epistemology |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Apr 2018 09:43 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Apr 2018 09:43 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/43123 |