Loss Aversion and Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Attribute Negotiations

Title data

Gimpel, Henner:
Loss Aversion and Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Attribute Negotiations.
In: Group Decision and Negotiation. Vol. 16 (2007) Issue 4 . - pp. 303-319.
ISSN 1572-9907
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-006-9051-9

Official URL:

Abstract in another language

Negotiation analysis and game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenous preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on and independent of the history of offers made. On the contrary, this paper argues that preferences might be based on attribute-wise reference points changing during the negotiation process. Aversion against losses relative to the reference point determines negotiators’ decisions in the negotiation and after its termination. The emergence and implications of reference points in a negotiation context are motivated, exemplified, and modeled formally. Furthermore, data from an internet experiment on endogenous preferences in bilateral multi-attribute negotiations is presented. The data supports the behavioral model.

Further data

Item Type:	Article in a journal
Refereed:	Yes
Keywords:	behavioral biases; experimental economics; loss aversion; negotiation analysis; prospect theory; quasi-endowment effect
Institutions of the University:	Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Business Administration Research Institutions Research Institutions > Affiliated Institutes Research Institutions > Affiliated Institutes > FIM Research Center Finance & Information Management Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Result of work at the UBT:	No
DDC Subjects:	000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Date Deposited:	14 Sep 2018 06:32
Last Modified:	22 Nov 2022 12:33
URI:	https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/45784