at Google ScholarTitle data
Fischer, Christian ; Normann, Hans-Theo:
Collusion and Bargaining in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly : An Experiment.
In: European Economic Review.
Vol. 111
(2019)
.
- pp. 360-379.
ISSN 0014-2921
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.10.005
Abstract in another language
In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost, we investigate experimentally how players cooperate (collude implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. In our treatments without communication, players fail to cooperate and essentially play the static Nash equilibrium (consistent with previous results). With communication, inefficient firms gain at the expense of efficient ones. When the role of the efficient firm is earned in a contest, the efficient firm earns higher profits than when this role is randomly allocated. Bargaining solutions do not satisfactorily predict outcomes.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Junior Professor International Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Former Professors > Junior Professor International Economics - Juniorprof. Dr. Christian Fischer-Thöne Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Former Professors |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Nov 2018 07:52 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2023 08:01 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/46328 |