Influence in Weighted Committee Games : A Power Index, Rule Comparisons, and the IMF Executive Board

Title data

Kurz, Sascha ; Mayer, Alexander ; Napel, Stefan:
Influence in Weighted Committee Games : A Power Index, Rule Comparisons, and the IMF Executive Board.
2019
Event: European Public Choice Society , 01.-04.04.2019 , Jerusalem.
(Conference item: Conference , Speech )

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Committee decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted voting rule. So does the distribution of power among committee members. We quantify how different aggregation methods such as pairwise majority votes, plurality with runoff, or Borda rule map asymmetric numbers of seats, shares, voting weights, etc. to influence on outcomes when preferences vary. A generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index is proposed and applied to the IMF Executive Board’s election of a Managing Director. It extends voting power analysis from binary votes to collective decisions on multiple options.