at Google ScholarTitle data
Schuessler, Rudolf:
Violating Strict Deontological Constraints : Excuse or Pardon?
In: Criminal Law and Philosophy.
Vol. 9
(2015)
Issue 4
.
- pp. 587-601.
ISSN 1871-9805
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9278-x
Abstract in another language
Deontologists often assume that ethical constraints hold ‘come what may’ but that violations of the constraints (such as violation of the torture prohibition) can be excused or pardoned. Vinit Haksar has argued for pardon as deontologically appropriate mitigation for the violation of deontological constraints. However, the reasons he adduces against excuse are inconclusive. In this paper, I show how complex the question of excuse versus pardon for deontological transgressions is. Liability for the development of character traits and the assumption of agent-centered responsibility have to be taken into account before the possibility of pardon can be identified as appropriate deontological softener for strict constraints.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Chair Philosophy II > Chair Philosophy II - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Rudolf Schüßler Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Chair Philosophy II |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Oct 2019 09:13 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2019 09:13 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/52924 |