Values under Uncertainty

Title data

Kurz, Sascha ; Mayer, Alexander:
Values under Uncertainty.
2019
Event: 15th European Meeting on Game Theory 2019 : Sing15 , 2-4.7.2019 , Turku, Finland.
(Conference item: Conference , Speech )

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Abstract in another language

Sharing costs or benefits obtained through cooperation is a central economic problem. One way to address this issue is to model the cooperative environment as a characteristic function form game and then to use a value, i.e., sharing rule, to determine a division. However, a shortcoming of this approach is that a real-valued number has to be assigned to each subset of players. This asks for too much in many applications since evaluating the precise worth of every coalition is either impossible or comes at a high cost. A useful tool to handle such situations are cooperative interval games. They assign an interval of real numbers to each coalition. We are interested in the computation of bounds for values of realizing
cooperative games within those ranges and present corresponding algorithms. Our approach proves to be particularly useful if the true but unknown game has
additional structure (e.g., monotonicity).