at Google ScholarTitle data
Herweg, Fabian ; Rosato, Antonio:
Bait and Ditch : Consumer Naïveté and Salesforce Incentives.
In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Vol. 29
(2020)
Issue 1
.
- pp. 97-121.
ISSN 1530-9134
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12336
Abstract in another language
We analyze a model of price competition between a transparent retailer and a deceptive one in a market where a fraction of consumers is naïve. The transparent retailer is an independent shop managed by its owner. The deceptive retailer belongs to a chain and is operated by a manager. The two retailers sell an identical base product, but the deceptive one also offers an add‐on. Rational consumers never consider buying the add‐on while naïve ones can be “talked” into buying it. By offering the manager a contract that pushes him to never sell the base good without the add‐on, the chain can induce an equilibrium in which both retailers obtain more‐than‐competitive profits. The equilibrium features price dispersion and market segmentation, with the deceptive retailer targeting only naïve consumers whereas the transparent retailer serves only rational ones.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | add-on pricing; bait and switch; consumer naïveté; incentive contract |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VIII: International Competition Policy > Chair Economics VIII: International Competition Policy - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Fabian Herweg Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VIII: International Competition Policy |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Feb 2020 09:26 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Jul 2020 07:01 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/53467 |