Why Deontologists Should Reject Agent-Relative Value and Embrace Agent-Relative Accountability

Title data

Schuessler, Rudolf:
Why Deontologists Should Reject Agent-Relative Value and Embrace Agent-Relative Accountability.
In: Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie. Vol. 3 (2020) . - pp. 315-335.
ISSN 2522-0071
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-020-00084-2

Official URL:

Abstract in another language

This paper claims that deontological and consequentialist ethics are best distinguished with reference to different assumptions concerning moral accountability and accounting. Deontological ethics can thereby be defended against the
accusation of inordinate concern with the moral purity of agents. Moreover, deontological ethics can and should reject being based on the concept of agent-relative value. Even under the assumption that deontological ethics can be consequentialized, agent-relative value need not play a fundamental role. This is not the same as denying agent-relativity a key role in deontological ethics. Deontological moral accounting of universal value should be regarded as agent-relative, whereas consequentialist accounting assumes a shared moral account of all moral agents.

Further data

Item Type:	Article in a journal
Refereed:	Yes
Keywords:	Deontology; Consequentialization; Agent-relative value; Accountability; Agent-relativity
Institutions of the University:	Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Chair Philosophy II Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Chair Philosophy II > Chair Philosophy II - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Rudolf Schüßler Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy
Result of work at the UBT:	Yes
DDC Subjects:	100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy
Date Deposited:	05 Nov 2020 08:19
Last Modified:	25 Mar 2021 11:12
URI:	https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/59222