Influence and manipulation in weighted committee voting

Title data

Kurz, Sascha ; Mayer, Alexander ; Napel, Stefan:
Influence and manipulation in weighted committee voting.
2021
Event: Aggregation across disciplines: connections and frameworks , 15.-17.12.2021 , CY Cergy Paris Université, Neuville-sur-Oise.
(Conference item: Workshop , Speech )

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Abstract in another language

Committee decisions on three or more alternatives depend on the adopted voting method and the underlying distribution of votes (e.g. voting weights, party seats, individual shareholdings). Based on structural analysis of how voting weights affect the aggregation of individual preferences into a collective decision and generalizations of the Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices from binary votes to general social choice, we study the distribution of voting power and who benefits from adoption of a particular voting rule (e.g. a plurality vote vs. plurality voting with a runoff vs. pairwise comparisons). We also investigate the interaction of voting weights, voting methods and the manipulability of committee decisions.