at Google ScholarTitle data
Mayer, Alexander ; Napel, Stefan:
Weighted Scoring Committees.
In: Games.
Vol. 12
(2021)
Issue 4
.
- 94.
ISSN 2073-4336
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040094
Abstract in another language
Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many different weights induce the same mapping from committee members’ preferences to winning candidates. The numbers of respective weight equivalence classes and hence of structurally distinct plurality committees, Borda commitees, etc. differ widely. There are 6, 51, and 5 plurality, Borda, and antiplurality committees, respectively, if three players choose between three candidates and up to 163 (229) committees for scoring rules in between plurality and Borda (Borda and antiplurality). A key implication is that plurality, Borda, and antiplurality rule are much less sensitive to weight changes than other scoring rules. We illustrate the geometry of weight equivalence classes, with a map of all Borda classes, and identify minimal integer representations.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | weighted voting; weighted committee games; scoring rules; simple voting games; collective choice |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Dec 2021 10:25 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Nov 2023 12:56 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/68186 |