at Google ScholarTitle data
Faravelli, Marco ; Man, Priscilla ; Nguyen, Bang Dinh:
Welfare Comparison of Electoral Systems under Power Sharing.
In: Social Choice and Welfare.
Vol. 47
(2016)
Issue 2
.
- pp. 413-429.
ISSN 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0970-3
Abstract in another language
We generalize Börgers’ (Am Econ Rev 94:57–66, 2004) results to a broad class of power sharing electoral systems. We show that voluntary voting under a power sharing regime Pareto dominates both random decision making and compulsory voting. We also show, however, that voluntary voting is not socially optimal, as individuals vote too frequently.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VII: Quantitative Economic History > Chair Economics VII: Quantitative Economic History - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Sebastian Till Braun Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VII: Quantitative Economic History |
| Result of work at the UBT: | No |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Mar 2022 08:15 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Mar 2022 08:15 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/68855 |