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Welfare Comparison of Electoral Systems under Power Sharing

Title data

Faravelli, Marco ; Man, Priscilla ; Nguyen, Bang Dinh:
Welfare Comparison of Electoral Systems under Power Sharing.
In: Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. 47 (2016) Issue 2 . - pp. 413-429.
ISSN 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0970-3

Abstract in another language

We generalize Börgers’ (Am Econ Rev 94:57–66, 2004) results to a broad class of power sharing electoral systems. We show that voluntary voting under a power sharing regime Pareto dominates both random decision making and compulsory voting. We also show, however, that voluntary voting is not socially optimal, as individuals vote too frequently.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Refereed: Yes
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VII: Quantitative Economic History > Chair Economics VII: Quantitative Economic History - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Sebastian Till Braun
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VII: Quantitative Economic History
Result of work at the UBT: No
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Date Deposited: 04 Mar 2022 08:15
Last Modified: 04 Mar 2022 08:15
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/68855