Title data
Güth, Werner ; Napel, Stefan:
Hiding or Revealing : Their Indirect Evolution in the Acquiring‑a‑Company Game.
In: Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review.
Vol. 19
(2022)
Issue 2
.
- pp. 569-585.
ISSN 2188-2096
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40844-022-00231-x
Abstract in another language
The Acquiring-a-Company game of Bazerman and Samuelson (J Confl Resolut 27(4):618–634, 1983) is modified by letting the privately informed seller send a numerical value message to the prospective buyer. A population of sellers reveal or hide their private information according to their categorical type rather than by engaging in consequentialistic decision-making. Population shares of the types evolve according to expected profits (fitness). The analysis illustrates how specific institutional and behavioral aspects shape the creation of surplus in the market and possibilities for maintaining a positive share of revealing sellers.
Further data
Item Type: | Article in a journal |
---|---|
Refereed: | Yes |
Keywords: | Indirect evolutionary approach; Categorical types; Asymmetric information; Gains from trade |
Subject classification: | JEL Classification: D01 C70 C73 C91 |
Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics |
Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Date Deposited: | 29 Sep 2022 05:35 |
Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2022 07:36 |
URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/72191 |