Hiding or Revealing : Their Indirect Evolution in the Acquiring‑a‑Company Game

Title data

Güth, Werner ; Napel, Stefan:
Hiding or Revealing : Their Indirect Evolution in the Acquiring‑a‑Company Game.
In: Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review. Vol. 19 (2022) Issue 2 . - pp. 569-585.
ISSN 2188-2096
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40844-022-00231-x

Official URL:

Abstract in another language

The Acquiring-a-Company game of Bazerman and Samuelson (J Confl Resolut 27(4):618–634, 1983) is modified by letting the privately informed seller send a numerical value message to the prospective buyer. A population of sellers reveal or hide their private information according to their categorical type rather than by engaging in consequentialistic decision-making. Population shares of the types evolve according to expected profits (fitness). The analysis illustrates how specific institutional and behavioral aspects shape the creation of surplus in the market and possibilities for maintaining a positive share of revealing sellers.

Further data

Item Type:	Article in a journal
Refereed:	Yes
Keywords:	Indirect evolutionary approach; Categorical types; Asymmetric information; Gains from trade
Subject classification:	JEL Classification: D01 C70 C73 C91
Institutions of the University:	Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics
Result of work at the UBT:	Yes
DDC Subjects:	300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Date Deposited:	29 Sep 2022 05:35
Last Modified:	05 Oct 2022 07:36
URI:	https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/72191