at Google ScholarTitle data
Kurz, Sascha:
Are Weighted Games Sufficiently Good for Binary Voting?
In: Homo Oeconomicus.
Vol. 38
(2021)
.
- pp. 29-36.
ISSN 2366-6161
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-021-00111-6
Abstract in another language
Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we loose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games. It turns out that the deviation is relatively small.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | power measurement; weighted games |
| Subject classification: | Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91B12 (91A12) |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics Profile Fields Profile Fields > Emerging Fields Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility Faculties |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Oct 2022 08:28 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Aug 2023 06:30 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/72283 |